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Abstract—Online programming discussion platforms such as
Stack Overflow serve as a rich source of information for software
developers. Available information include vibrant discussions
and oftentimes ready-to-use code snippets. Previous research
identified Stack Overflow as one of the most important in-
formation sources developers rely on. Anecdotes report that
software developers copy and paste code snippets from those
information sources for convenience reasons. Such behavior
results in a constant flow of community-provided code snippets
into production software. To date, the impact of this behaviour
on code security is unknown.
We answer this highly important question by quantifying
the proliferation of security-related code snippets from Stack
Overflow in Android applications available on Google Play.
Access to the rich source of information available on Stack
Overflow including ready-to-use code snippets provides huge
benefits for software developers. However, when it comes to
code security there are some caveats to bear in mind: Due
to the complex nature of code security, it is very difficult to
provide ready-to-use and secure solutions for every problem.
Hence, integrating a security-related code snippet from Stack
Overflow into production software requires caution and expertise.
Unsurprisingly, we observed insecure code snippets being copied
into Android applications millions of users install from Google
Play every day.
To quantitatively evaluate the extent of this observation, we
scanned Stack Overflow for code snippets and evaluated their
security score using a stochastic gradient descent classifier. In
order to identify code reuse in Android applications, we applied
state-of-the-art static analysis. Our results are alarming: 15.4%
of the 1.3 million Android applications we analyzed, contained
security-related code snippets from Stack Overflow. Out of these
97.9% contain at least one insecure code snippet.
I. INTRODUCTION
Discussion platforms for software developers have grown in
popularity. Especially inexperienced programmers treasure the
direct help from the community providing easy guide and most
often even ready-to-use code snippets. It is widely believed
that copying such code snippets into production software is
generally practiced not only by the novice but by large parts
of the developer community. Access to the rich source of
information given by public discussion platforms provides
quick solutions. This allows fast prototyping and an efficient
workflow. Further, the public discussions by sometimes ex-
perienced developers potentially promote distribution of best-
practices and may improve code quality on a large basis.
However, when it comes to code security, we often observe
the opposite. Android-related discussions on Stack Overflow
for example include an impressive conglomeration of oddities:
from requesting too many and unneeded permissions [1]
to implementing insecure X.509 certificate validation [2] to
misusing Android’s cryptographic API [3], a developer who is
seeking help can find solutions for almost any problem. While
such solutions oftentimes provide functional code snippets,
many of them threaten code security. Those insecure code
snippets commonly have a rather solid life-cycle: provided by
the community, copied and pasted by the developer, shipped
to the customer, and exploited by the attacker. To date it is
unknown to what extent software developers copy and paste
code snippets from information sources into production soft-
ware. Is this phenomenon limited to just occasional instances,
or is it rather a general and dangerous trend threatening code
security to a large extent?
We answer this highly important question by measuring the
frequency of 1,161 insecure code snippets posted on Stack
Overflow that were copied and pasted into 1,305,820 Android
applications available on Google Play. We demonstrate that
the proliferation of insecure code snippets within the Android
ecosystem, and thus the impact of insecure code snippets
posted on Stack Overflow, poses a major and dangerous
problem for Android application security.
Our Contributions
We investigate the extent security-related code snippets
posted on Stack Overflow were copied into Android appli-
cations available on Google Play. Our contributions can be
summarized as follows:
• We identified all Android posts on Stack Overflow,
extracted all (4,019) security-related code snippets and
analyzed their security using a robust machine learning
approach. As a result we provide a security analysis for
all security-related Android code snippets available on
Stack Overflow.
• We applied state-of-the-art static code analysis techniques
to detect extracted code snippets from Stack Overflow in
1.3 million Android applications.
• We found that 15.4% of all 1.3 million Android ap-
plications contained security-related code snippets from
Stack Overflow. Out of these 97.9% contain at least one
insecure code snippet.
• We designed and implemented a fully automated large-
scale processing pipeline for measuring the flow of
security-related code snippets from Stack Overflow into
Android applications.
• We make all data available on https://www.aisec.
fraunhofer.de/stackoverflow.
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Fig. 1: Overall processing pipeline of code extraction (1), filtering (2), classification (3), program dependency graph generation
(4), and clone detection (5).
Our processing pipeline is fully automated and designed to
scale to extensive measurements of platforms other than Stack
Overflow and software repositories other than Google Play.
II. PROCESSING PIPELINE ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we discuss the architecture of our processing
pipeline. The individual steps of the processing pipeline are
described in detail in subsequent sections.
As depicted in Figure 1 the code originates in the Stack
Overflow database (on the left) and flows into Google Play
(on the right). To measure this flow we first crawl Stack
Overflow and extract every single code snippet in the database
(1). From this comprehensive snippet collection we filter those
that are security-related (2). We discuss steps (1) and (2) in
detail in Section III on code extraction and filtering. This
provides us with a set of security-related snippets. In order
to label each of them secure or insecure we define labeling
rules as described in Section IV and apply machine learning
classification (3) using support vector machines (cf. Section
V). Next, we generate an abstract representation of each
labeled code snippet (4) that allows us to detect their clones in
Google Play (5) (cf. Section VI). Each step is fully automated
and designed for large scale analysis. Only the training step for
supervised machine learning classification (3) requires manual
labeling of training data. However, this must be done only once
for a small fraction of snippets, classification of very large
sets of code snippets afterwards runs fully automated and is
therefore just a matter of processing power and time. As we
will show in the evaluation in Section VII-C our proposed
approach is time-efficient and yields decent results.
III. CODE EXTRACTION AND FILTERING
In the first step (1) of our processing pipeline we crawl
discussion threads from a developer discussion platform for
actual code snippets. In a second step (2) we extract the
security-related fraction from the collected snippet set. We
begin this section by defining the criteria for security-related
code snippets and continue with describing both processing
steps which allow us to extract security-related code snippets
from Stack Overflow.
A. Security-related Code Snippets
On Android, security operations include but are not limited
to cryptographic operations, secure network communication
and transmission, validation via PKI-based mechanisms, as
well as authentication and access control. For each of these
operations, developers can select from a set of security APIs
to perform them. We define code elements of these APIs
as an indicator for security-related code. A code snippet is
considered security-related if it makes calls to one of the
following Java security libraries: [4]
• Cryptography: Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA),
Java Cryptography Extension (JCE)
• Secure network communications: Java Secure Socket
Extension (JSSE), Java Generic Security Service (JGSS),
Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)
• Public key infrastructure: X.509 and Certificate Revoca-
tion Lists (CRL) in java.security.cert, Java certification
path API, PKCS#11, OCSP
• Authentication and access control: Java Authentication
and Authorization Service (JAAS)
Additionally, we included code snippets with reference to
the following security libraries, which were specially designed
for Android: BouncyCastle (BC) is the default, pre-installed
cryptographic service provider on Android and is widely
used [3]. SpongyCastle1 (SC) gives a repackaged version of
BC which provides additional functionality. We looked for
code snippets containing both BC and SC API calls.
Furthermore, we extracted code snippets for the Apache
TLS/SSL package as part of the HttpClient library which
is one of the most used libraries on GitHub [5].
We also included code snippets that reference security
libraries specifically designed with usability in mind [6], e.g.
keyczar [7] and jasypt [8], which were designed to simplify
the safe use of cryptography for developers.
To contrast Android’s default providers and the usable
security libraries with a more inconvenient alternative, we
searched for snippets that use GNU Crypto. Although this
library also implements a JCA provider, it is difficult to
integrate into Android [9], which makes it interesting to see
1cf. https://rtyley.github.io/spongycastle/
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Standard API
BouncyCastle
SpongyCastle
Apache TLS/SSL
keyczar
jasypt
GNU Crypto
= fully applies;
= does not apply at all
TABLE I: Cryptographic libraries and their supported features.
how it is being discussed on Stack Overflow, as well as
whether or not developers use it.
Table I lists the considered security libraries and gives an
overview of their supported features.
B. Finding Security-related Code Snippets on Stack Overflow
Code snippets on Stack Overflow are surrounded by
<code> tags and can therefore easily be separated from
accompanying text and extracted.
We were interested in security-related code snippets
only. Therefore, we filtered code snippets that contain API
elements of the security libraries described in Section III-A.
In order to decide to which API a code element belongs, we
need Fully Qualified Names (FQN) (i.e. package names in
Java) of elements in code snippets. Since class and method
names are not unique, different API can contain classes (e.g.
android.util.Base64, java.util.Base64) and
methods (e.g. java.security.Cipher.getInstance,
java.security.Signature.getInstance) which
share the Partially Qualified Name (PQN). Therefore, it is
necessary to know the unique FQN to be able to disambiguate
code elements.
Code snippets posted on Stack Overflow are often incom-
plete or erroneous and therefore only PQNs may be available.
Since disambiguating partial Java programs is an undecidable
problem [10], we used an oracle called JavaBaker [11] to
decide to which API a code element belongs. The oracle
consists of a user-defined set of APIs which is used to apply a
constraint-based approach to disambiguate types of given code
elements. Given a code snippet JavaBaker returns the FQN for
each element in the code, if it belongs to one of the initially
given libraries. The JavaBaker oracle has a precision of 0.97
and a recall of 0.83 [11]. It is not restricted to specific libraries
which allowed us to apply it for our use case. With JavaBaker,
using the security libraries explained in Section III-A as the
user-defined set of APIs, we were able to determine to which
of the given security APIs a type reference, method call, or
field access in a code snippet belongs. A code snippet is
therefore considered security-related if the returned result of
the oracle is not empty. We apply this to filter security-related
code snippets from Stack Overflow.
Since the security APIs might contain packages whose
usage does not indicate implementation of security code (e. g.
util or math packages), our snippet filter includes a blacklist to
ignore those non-security-related packages. We compiled this
blacklist manually by inspecting each package individually.
Code snippets may contain sparsely used code elements.
For instance, an object can be declared and initialized, but not
used subsequently in the snippet. In this case, the oracle only
has the PQN of the element and the call to the constructor as
information to decide the FQN. This can lead to false positives
because the oracle has insufficient information to narrow down
possible candidates. To give an example, the oracle reported
java.security.auth.login.Configuration as
the FQN for a code element with type Configuration
whose true FQN was android.content.res.Con-
figuration. The related object only made a call to the
constructor, hence it was impossible to disambiguate the
given type Configuration. Luckily, these false positives
are easily detectable by filtering out snippets for which the
oracle reports the <init> method only or no methods at all.
We do not worry about true positives we might sort out this
way, as we are not interested in code snippets that contain
security elements which are not used after initialization.
C. Limitations
The main purpose of the the oracle-based filter is to decide
whether a given snippet is security-related. As it does this by
examining the snippet for utilization of the defined security
libraries, it might label a snippet as security-related, even
though it does not belong to a security context. This is the case
if an API element which is heavily used for security purposes
can also be used in a non-security context. For instance, in
a security context snippets would use hashing algorithms for
verifying data integrity. In a non-security context hashes may
be used for data management purposes only. In both cases the
snippet would reference elements of one of the given security
APIs which causes the filter to label the snippets as security-
related.
IV. CODE LABELING
Now that we have extracted security-related code snippets
(cf. Figure 1, (1) and (2)), we need to classify them as such.
Therefore, we first provide the label definition and labeling
rules and give details on the actual machine learning based
classification in Section V. We apply supervised learning and
therefore need to manually label a small fraction of extracted
code snippets to train the support vector machine. Therefore a
pair of two reviewers inspected the set of 1,360 security-related
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snippets extracted from answer posts from Stack Overflow.
In case of conflicts, a third reviewer was consulted and the
conflict was resolved (by explaining the reasoning of the
reviews).
To better understand which topics were discussed (in combi-
nation with code snippets) on Stack Overflow, we categorized
each code snippet into one or multiple of the following cat-
egories: SSL/TLS, Symmetric cryptography, Asymmetric cryp-
tography, One way hash functions, (Secure) Random number
generation.
A. Security Labels
We checked whether or not code snippets were security risks
when pasted into Android application code and labeled them
either secure or insecure:
Secure
• Snippets that contain up-to-date and strong algorithms
for symmetric cryptography [12], [13], sufficiently large
keys for RSA or elliptic curve cryptography [14], [15] or
secure random number generation [3].
• Snippets that contain code that does not adhere to security
best practices, but does not result in easily exploitable
vulnerabilities either, e.g. usage of RSA with no or
PKCS1 padding [16], SHA1 or outdated versions of
SSL/TLS [12].
• Snippets that contain code whose security depended on
additional developer input, e.g. the symmetric cryptog-
raphy algorithm or key size is a parameter, which is
configurable by the developer.
Insecure
• Snippets that contained obviously insecure code, e.g.
using outdated algorithms or static initialization vectors
and keys for symmetric cryptography, weak RSA keys
for asymmetric cryptography, insecure random number
generation [3], or insecure SSL/TLS implementations [2].
This labeling is very conservative as it classifies only the
definitely vulnerable code snippets as insecure.
B. Labeling Rules
Code security was investigated for the category specific
parameters, which are introduced in this section. Based on
these parameters we state a security metric which provides
the rules for labeling the code snippets. Our stated security
metric does not intend to be an exhaustive metric for each
security category, but only considers security parameters which
were actually used in the snippets of our corpus. In the
following, we provide tables for each category which depict
secure and insecure parameters for quick lookup. Additionally,
we give details on parameters that were ambiguous or need
further explanation. We defined the following labeling rules
for security classification:
1) SSL/TLS: Table II illustrates the TLS parameters
we investigated [2]. The HostnameVerifier checks
whether a given certificate’s common name matches the
server’s hostname. TrustManager implementations
Parameter Secure Insecure
Hostname browser compatible, allow all
Verifier strict hosts [17]
Trust default, trust all [2],
Manager secure bad pinning [18], [17],
pinning validity only
Version >=TLSv1.1 [12] <TLSv1.1 [19], [12], [20], [21]
Cipher DHE RSA, ECDHE RC4,3DES,
Suite AES>=128, GCM AES-CBC
SHA>=256 [12] MD5, MD2 [12], [22]
OnReceived- cancel proceed
SSLError
TABLE II: Secure and insecure TLS parameters.
allow developers to implement custom certificate (chain)
validation strategies. Insecure hostname verifier or trust
manager implementations make an application vulnerable
to Man-In-The-Middle attacks. According to [2] we labeled
TrustManager and HostnameVerifier implementing
insecure validation strategies as insecure. TrustManagers
that implement public key or certificate pinning are
considered secure. However, we label pinning as insecure
if the pinset contains ambiguous values, e. g. serial number
of the certificate [18], [17]. We also investigated TLS
security of WebViews. Developers can implement their
own OnReceivedSSLError method to handle certificate
validation errors while loading content via HTTPS and can
ignore validation errors by proceeding the TLS handshake.
Parameter Secure Insecure
Cipher/Mode AES/GCM [12] RC2 [23], RC4 [24],
AES/CFB [12] DES [23], 3DES [25],
AES/CBC* AES/ECB [3],
AES/CBC** [22]
Blowfish [26], [27]
Key provider static [3],
generated bad derivation [3]
Initialization Vector provider zeroed [3],
(IV) generated static [3],
bad derivation [3],
Password Based >=1k iterations [13], <1k iterations [13],
Encryption (PBE) >=64-bit salt [13], <64-bit salt [13]
non-static salt [13] static salt [3]
TABLE III: Secure and insecure symmetric cryptography
parameters.
2) Symmetric Cryptography: We investigated snippets for
symmetric cryptography parameters as illustrated in Table III.
We labeled Ciphers and Modes of operation which are
known security best practices as secure. Ciphers and modes
with known practical attacks were labeled insecure. The AES
encryption mode CBC is depicted in both columns secure
and insecure because known padding oracle attacks are only
feasible in a client/server environment. If this encryption mode
is used in a different scenario, we consider it as secure [22].
We labeled cryptographic Keys and IV which were statically
assigned, zeroed or directly derived from text (such as pass-
words) as insecure [3].
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Parameter Secure Insecure
Cipher/Mode RSA
RSA/ECB
RSA/None
Padding PKCS1*, PKCS1**
PKCS8,
OAEPWithSHA-256
AndMGF1Padding,
Key RSA >= 2048 bit RSA < 2048 bit [14]
ECC >= 224 bit ECC < 224 bit [15]
TABLE IV: Secure and insecure asymmetric cryptography
parameters.
3) Asymmetric Cryptography: We investigated snippets for
asymmetric cryptography parameters as illustrated in table
IV. The JCE API provides different Cipher and Mode
transformation strings for RSA which include the definition
of a block mode, e. g. RSA/ECB. However, these modes are
ignored by the underlying provider and have no implication
on security [28]. For RSA, we consider the used Padding
and Key length to evaluate security [14]. We distinguish
between a client/server and a non-client/server scenario. Only
in the first scenario PKCS1 padding is vulnerable to padding
oracle attacks and seen as a secure padding otherwise [16].
Secure and insecure key lengths for RSA and Eliptic curve
cryptography [14], [15] are shown in table IV.
Parameter Secure Insecure
PBKDF [PBKDF2](Hmac) [PBKDF2](Hmac)
>=SHA224 [29] MD2, MD5 [29]
Digital Signature >SHA1 MD2, MD5
Credentials >SHA1 MD2, MD5
TABLE V: Secure and insecure hash function parameters
4) One Way Hash Functions: We investigated snippets for
one way hash function parameters, as illustrated in Table V,
in the context of password-based key derivation, digital sig-
natures, and authentication/authorization. These were the only
categories where code snippets from our analysis corpus made
explicit use of hash functions. In the context of OAuth and
SASL (authentication and authorization), attacks are mainly
possible through flaws in website implementations [30]. There-
fore, we only analyzed which hashing schemes were used for
hashing credentials.
Parameter Secure Insecure
Type SecureRandom Random
Seeding nextBytes, setSeed->nextBytes,
nextBytes->setSeed setSeed with
static values [3]
TABLE VI: Secure and insecure parameters for (secure)
random number generation.
5) (Secure) Random Number Generation: We investigated
snippets for (secure) random number generation parameters
shown in table VI. The main problem which can lead to
security problems lies in provider specific implementation
and ambiguous documentation of manual seeds [31]. We
conclude that besides calling nextBytes only, which lets
SecureRandom seed itself, calling nextBytes followed
by setSeed is a secure sequence because SecureRandom
is still self-seeded. The latter call to setSeed just supple-
ments the seed and does not replace it [31]. Without calling
nextBytes first, a call to setSeed may completely replace
the seed. This behavior differs between several providers and is
often ill-described in official documentation [31]. Therefore,
we consider this call sequence as insecure if an insufficient
seed is given.
C. Limitations
Our code snippet reviews might be limited in multiple ways
in this step. Although we based our review decisions on widely
accepted best practices and previous research results and let
multiple reviewers review all snippets we cannot entirely elim-
inate incorrect labeling. The security of most code snippets
depends on input values (e. g. initialization parameters) that
were not given in all code snippets. Therefore, our results
might under- or overreport the prevalence of insecure APIs in
Android applications.
V. CODE CLASSIFICATION
In this section, we present our method for large-scale code
snippet classification, which corresponds to (3) in the overall
processing pipeline (cf. Figure 1).
Manual snippet analysis allows profound insight into se-
curity problems specifically raised from crowd-sourced code
snippets. Further, it allows the creation of a rich data set that
annotates crowd-sourced code snippets from Stack Overflow.
This opens the doors for machine learning based classification.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to contribute
such a data set to the machine learning community.
The security scoring of code snippets can be seen as a
classification problem, which we can effectively solve by
a variety of classifiers, e. g. feed-forward neural networks,
decision trees, support vector machines, and many more. By
manually labeling a subset of the collected snippets as secure
and insecure (cf. Section IV), we are able to produce a
training data set for binary classifiers. The trained model is
then applied to classify unknown code snippets. We apply the
binary classifier on all security-related snippets extracted by
the oracle-based filter to provide an automatic procedure of
security assessment.
Note that it is arguable that machine learning based meth-
ods would deliver more benefits than rule-based methods on
solving security problems. Our binary classifier can efficiently
extract discriminative information from the data set we col-
lected, which might be overlooked by rule based methods.
The features rely merely on the vocabulary level of input code
snippets, without even understanding how they are functioning.
This allows the model to easily scale up to thousands of
snippets in a few seconds which is not affordable for manual
processing.
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Fig. 2: Illustration of SVM binary classifier. It maximizes a
margin 1‖w‖2 to separate positive and negative samples in its
correct side. Note that a small portion of data samples are
allowed within the margin, which can be controlled by a set
of slack variables ξ.
A. Support Vector Machine
We employ the binary classifier Support Vector Machine
(SVM) as our learning model. In our scenario, the labeled
training data set contains two classes, namely, insecure and
secure code snippets. The collected code snippets can be
regarded as documents. We argue that discriminative patterns
can be discovered by examining the tokens in code snippets.
These can be any combination of alphabets and symbols, e.g.,
while, return. Therefore, in our setting the learning problem
is a document classification problem with binary classes from
a set of tokens.
Given a training dataset of n samples X = {xi}ni=1, and
its corresponding labels {yi}ni=1 ∈ [+1,−1], a SVM classifier
learns a margin that maximally separates training samples into
two classes as illustrated in Figure 2. The objective function
can be formulated as follows,
minw,b,ξ
1
2w
Tw + C
∑n
i=1 ξi (1)
s.t. yi(wTφ(xi) + b) ≥ 1− ξi
ξi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n
In (1) we note that minimizing w equals maximizing a margin.
SVM introduces a set of slack variables {ξi} to soften the
margin, such that a small portion of training samples are
allowed to be misclassified. Importantly, we also note that
the feature mapping φ(xi) defined over X can intrinsically
handle non-linear cases by the so called ’kernel trick’. For
more details, we refer to [32].
B. Feature Extraction
Since the learning problem of detecting the security level
of code snippets can be viewed as a document classification
problem, we employ a common feature extraction method
named tf-idf vectorizer [33]. The tf-idf vectorizer transforms
the whole set of code snippets into a numeric matrix. Each
of the code snippets is considered as a document, namely an
input data sample. We compute term frequency (tf ) and inverse
document frequency (idf ) with respect to the total number of
snippets.
For each snippet, the term frequency is computed by
counting each token within its document. For the inverse
document frequency, we compute the inverse of the number
of documents where each token appears in. Then the tf-idf
score is simply a multiplication of term frequency and inverse
document frequency. In the end, we maintain a vocabulary of
code tokens parsed from the snippets. This vocabulary will be
converted into a numeric vector of a fixed length containing
all possible tokens’ frequency in this snippet. Normally, tf-idf
vectorizer will form a high dimensional sparse data set with
many entries being set to zero, if all the individual tokens
are taken into account. Some tokens, e.g., randomly generated
numbers, variable and class names, only appear in particular
documents and therefore their document frequency is quite
low. Document frequency can be very high for other tokens,
e.g., common language terms such as return, public. The tf-
idf scores for these tokens will be automatically justified by
the inverse document frequency, such that their contribution
to the discriminative function will also be reweighed. Finally,
the sparse data set is then fed to SVM as the training data set.
We expect the tokens found in each snippet to represent an
encoding of how secure the code snippet will be.
VI. PDG GENERATION AND CODE DETECTION
Our processing pipeline has now filtered security-related
code snippets from Stack Overflow and classified them either
as secure or insecure (cf. Figure 1, (1) to (3)). Next, we aim to
detect these code snippets in compiled Android applications
from Google Play, (cf. Figure 1, (4) and (5)).
Snippets are given as source code and Android applications
are only available as high-level binaries (i. e. DEX files). To
be able to apply static code analysis techniques, code snippets
and Android applications must be transformed into the same
(intermediate) representation (IR). In this section we first
describe this transformation step (4) and then give a detailed
explanation of the method we apply to detect code snippets in
Android applications (5).
A. Code Snippet Compiling
Static code analysis tools require complete programs to
work properly [10]. Most code snippets from Stack Overflow
however are not complete programs. They mostly do not
compile without error since required method or class infor-
mation is missing [11]. A snippet may be a subset of a larger
program which is not accessible or additional dependencies
(e. g. external libraries) might me unknown [10].
For incomplete code snippets creating a typed and complete
IR is difficult. To overcome this, we use Partial Program Anal-
ysis (PPA) [10]. It was specifically designed to create complete
and typed abstract syntax trees (AST) from source code of
partial Java programs. PPA is able to resolve syntactic ambi-
guities which often times arise in code snippets. For example,
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the statement SSLSocketFactory.getDefault() does
not allow to decide if SSLSocketFactory is a class
or field name if not explicitly declared. In this specific
case, SSLSocketFactory is a missing class and therefore
getDefault() should be resolved to a static method call.
PPA is also able to disambiguate possible typing problems
which arise in case not all declared types are available. This
is done by reconstructing data types from the snippets without
having access to source files, binaries or libraries. For data
types that cannot be resolved applying PPA, a generic data type
UNKNOWNP.UNKNOWN is used. This ensures that the created
AST remains complete.
To transform snippets and applications into the same IR
we use WALA2. Since WALA operates on JVM bytecode,
we transform Android applications to JVM bytecode using
enjarify [34] first. To be able to operate on Stack Overflow
code snippets, we modified WALA by integrating PPA. This
allows us to transform incomplete code snippets into WALAs
IR. Before transformation, we make sure code snippets repre-
sent a complete Java class. Based on these snippets, we create
the complete and typed AST using PPA. We were able to
successfully process 1,293 answer (85.2%) and 1,668 question
snippets (66.6%). Snippets which could not be compiled
mostly had a too erroneous syntax and were therefore rejected
by WALA. Furthermore, a lot of snippets contained a mixture
of Java code and non-commented text (e. g code blocks were
replaced with ’(...)’). We ignored those snippets for further
analyses [11].
B. Code Snippets in Apps
Code snippet containment is given if an application contains
code that is very similar to the code snippet. However, a full
match is not necessary. Instead we use a detection algorithm
which is robust to fractional and non-malicious modifications3.
We base code snippet detection on finding similar Program
Dependency Graphs (PDG) which store data dependencies by
applying a modified approach of Crussel et al. [35]. They
create PDGs for each method and define the independent sub-
graphs of a PDG as the basic code features that are considered
for reuse detection. A method’s PDG may contain several data
independent subgraphs which are called semantic blocks. Code
similarity is defined on the amount of similar semantic blocks
that are shared among the compared code. Following this
approach provides robustness to high-level modifications and
trivial control-flow alterations, as well as non-malicious code
insertions/deletion, code reordering, constants modifications
and method restructurings as described in [35].
Though this approach allows the detection of reused code
that has been subject to the defined modifications, we consider
some of the given robustness features as inappropriate for our
use case. It has several drawbacks when applied on detecting
reuse of code snippets in relatively large applications. Many
snippets are quite small in terms of lines of code and therefore
2http://wala.sourceforge.net
3Code obfuscation is not intended to be covered by our approach
result in small PDGs. In this scenario, different code might
result in identical PDGs by chance. Therefore, we apply a
more strict approach which additionally compares constants
and method names that belong to a semantic block. This
is reasonable because constants are critical for initializing
Android security APIs. For instance cryptographic ciphers or
TLS sockets are selected by using a transformation String
(e. g. AES, TLS). Critical information like cryptographic keys,
key lengths, initialization vectors, passwords and salts can be
statically assigned in the code.
To be able to detect reused constants they must not have
been modified. Additionally, we compare method names that
are part of a semantic block and belong to APIs of our
predefined set of security libraries. This allows to distinguish
security-related parts of the code, in case of different code
with identical semantic blocks and empty or identical constant
sets. Finally, we disallow class and method restructuring. This
is necessary because we have have to ensure that detected
semantic blocks are contained in classes and methods that
have the same structure as the snippet. We compare semantic
blocks, constants and method names on a per method base and
ensure (nested) class membership by analyzing path names of
all detected methods.
To avoid computational overhead, we limit the number of
classes to search for code snippets to classes that contain
security-related API calls as defined in Section III-B.
Finding subgraph isomorphisms in PDGs is NP-hard and
therefore not applicable for large-scale analysis [36]. There-
fore, we follow the approach of embedding graphs in vector
spaces in order to reduce the problem of finding similar graphs
to the problem of finding similar vectors [37]. We apply the
embedding algorithm provided by Crussel et al. [36] which
assigns a semantic vector to each semantic block. The semantic
vector stores information about nodes and edges, i. e. the over-
all structure of a semantic block. Nodes represent instructions,
edges represent data dependencies between instructions.
Each instruction type as provided by WALAs IR has two
corresponding fields in the vector. One field stores node and
the other stores edge information. The count of nodes for each
instruction type (e. g. invokevirtual, getfield, new or return) in
the semantic block is stored in the related nodes field of the
instruction type in the vector. The maximum out node degree
for each instruction type is used to store information about
PDG edges. It holds the maximum count of outgoing edges
over all nodes in a semantic block for a given instruction type
and is stored in the related edges field of an instruction type
in the vector.
To decide if two semantic vectors are similar, we calculate
their Jaccard similarity [38], [39] which describes the simi-
larity ratio of two sets. Jaccard similarity for sets represented
as binary vectors X,Y is defined as Js(X,Y ) =
∑
i(Xi∧Yi)∑
i(Xi∨Yi) .
However, since the semantic vector stores count information
of nodes and edges belonging to a semantic block, we define
Jaccard similarity as Js(X,Y ) =
∑
imin(Xi,Yi)∑
imax(Xi,Yi)
. Hence, two
statements of the same instruction type in the semantic block
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represent different elements in the set representation of the
semantic block. This is also true for outgoing edges which
belong to the maximum out node degree. Therefore, two
outgoing edges of a single node are different elements in
the set representation. Furthermore, this definition ensures that
only elements of the same instruction type are compared.
PPA is able to create an IR of an incomplete code snippet
with an average correctness of 91% [10]. This gives us a
threshold for Jaccard similarity of 0.91. To decide if method
names and constants of a semantic block are contained in
another semantic block, we calculate their Jaccard contain-
ment. Jaccard containment depicts the containment ratio of an
arbitrary set X in another set Y and is defined as Jc(X,Y ) =
|X∧Y |
|X| . We calculate both Jaccard containment of two method
name and constant sets to evaluate whether all methods or
constants are contained. We rely on a Jaccard containment
value of 1.0 to satisfy the requirements of VI-B. We define
containment of a code snippet in an app iff the following holds
for each method in the snippet:
• For all given semantic blocks we find semantic blocks
that satisfy Jaccard similarity and are contained in a single
method contained in the callgraph of a given application.
• The method name set is fully contained in the same
method.
• The constants set is fully contained in the same method.
• They belong to the same (nested) class.
C. Exotic Case
Empty TrustManager implementations require special treat-
ment. They exclusively consist of overwritten methods (e. g.
cf. Listing 4). These methods are mostly empty which
means their PDG and methods and constants sets are also
empty. Therefore, our approach cannot distinguish these meth-
ods. To avoid false positives, the TrustManager’s methods
checkClientTrusted, checkServerTrusted and
getAcceptedIssuers receive special treatment. In case
an empty method has been detected in the call graph of an ap-
plication, we compare the method’s fully qualified name with
the method names given above. This way, we can successfully
identify empty TrustManager implementations without false
positives.
VII. EVALUATION
In this section we present a detailed evaluation of our
approach. We discuss benchmarks and numbers for each step
of our processing pipeline (cf. Figure 1). Further, we compare
our results with feedback from the Stack Overflow community,
provided in the respective code threads of copied insecure
snippets.
A. Evaluation of Code Extraction and Filtering
To systematically investigate the occurrence and quality of
Android related code snippets on Stack Overflow, we down-
loaded4 a dataset of all Stack Overflow posts in March 2016,
4 archive.org offers the option to download an archive of all Stack Overflow
posts from their website, cf. https://archive.org/details/stackexchange
which gave us a dataset of 29,499,660 posts. We extracted all
posts which were tagged with the android tag - this resulted
in 818,572 question threads with 1,165,350 answers. Questions
in our data set had 1.4 answers on average. The oldest post
in the dataset was from August, 2008. 559,933 (68.4%) of the
questions and 744,166 (63.9%) of the answers contained at
least one code snippet. Posts had 1,639.4 views on average.
The most popular post in our dataset had 794,592 visitors.
With the oracle-based parser (as described in Section III) we
filtered the 818,572 questions and the 1,165,350 answer posts
from Stack Overflow which revealed 2,504 (2,474 distinct)
security-related snippets from question posts and 1,517 (1,360
distinct) security-related code snippets from answer posts,
respectively. In summary, using the JavaBaker oracle, we
could successfully identify security-related snippets as shown
in Table VII.
The majority of snippets (2,841, i.e. 70.7%) were related
to the java.security API which implements access control,
generation/storage of public key pairs, message digest, sig-
nature and secure random number generation. Most snip-
pets were related to cryptographic key initialization, stor-
age (e. g. java.security.Key, java.security.KeyPairGenerator
or java.security.KeyStore – 44.9%) and message digests
(java.security.MessageDigest – 30.4%). This attunes to our
intuition, as almost all cryptographic implementations require
key management and hash functions are cryptographic primi-
tives.
Code containing Android’s cryptographic API was sec-
ond most prevalent and present in 1,286 (31.9%) code
snippets. 1,088 (84.6%) of these code snippets applied the
javax.crypto.Cipher API and hence, contained code for sym-
metric encryption/decryption. Interestingly, many snippets em-
ploy user-chosen raw keys for encryption (701 snippets with
SecretKeySpec) instead of generating secure random keys
by using the API (207 snippets with KeyGenerator). This
indicates that most of the keys are hard-coded into the snippet,
which states a high risk of key leakage if reused in an
application due to reverse engineering.
The TLS/SSL package javax.net.ssl was used in 28.9% of
the code snippets. The majority of these code snippets (545,
i.e. 46.7%), contained custom TrustManagers to implement
X.509 certificate validation. Optimistically, by implementing
a custom trust manager, developers might aim at higher
security by only trusting their own infrastructure. Practically,
we observe that custom trust managers basically ignore au-
thentication at all [2]. 17.1% of the code snippets contained
custom hostname verifiers. Apache’s SSL library was mainly
used for enabling deprecated hostname verifiers that turned off
effective hostname verification.
Code snippets containing code for BouncyCastle, Spongy-
Castle and SUN were rarely found. This could be due to the
fact that those libraries are mostly called directly by only
changing the security provider. Interestingly, nearly no (0.3%)
snippets contained code for the easy-to-use jasypt and keyzcar
libraries. Possible reasons could be their low popularity or
good usability. Similarly, the GNU cryptographic API was
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rarely used. This might be due to the difficulty to integrate
it in an Android application [9].
Namespace Snippets Namespace Snippets
javax.crypto 1,286 android.security 5
Cipher 1,088 com.sun.security 5
KeyGenerator 207 gnu.crypto 47
spec.SecretKeySpec 701 java.security 2,841
spec.PBEKeySpec 69 javax.security 44
spec.DESedeKeySpec 6 javax.xml.crypto 3
spec.DESKeySpec 21 org.bouncycastle 48
spec.IvParameterSpec 338 org.spongycastle 44
spec.RC2ParameterSpec 1 org.jasypt 11
Mac 85 org.apache.http.conn.ssl 241
Sealed 8 AllowAllHostnameVerifier 184
javax.net.ssl 1,166 StrictHostnameVerifier 51
TrustManager 545 BrowserCompatHostnameVerifier 8
HostnameVerifier 200 TrustSelfSignedStrategy 1
SSLSocket 533 SSLSocketFactory 105
org.keyczar 2
TABLE VII: Snippet counts per library.
B. Evaluation of Code Classification
Altogether, we classified 1,360 distinct security-related code
snippets to provide a training set for the machine learning
based classification model. This set contains all security-
related code snippets we found in Android-related answer
posts. We then applied the trained classifier on the complete
set of 3,834 distinct security-related code snippets found in
Android posts, including both questions (64.53%) and answers
(35.47%). The security classification results of the training set
are presented first and are described as follows:
The qualitative description of the snippets is divided into
the security categories TLS/SSL, symmetric cryptography,
asymmetric cryptography, random number generation, mes-
sage digests, digital signatures, authentication, and storage.
For each category, we describe why we consider the respective
code snippets to be insecure, what has been done wrong and
why it (supposedly) has been done wrong. Whenever possible,
we give counts for security mistakes and examples for the
security mistakes we found.
Second, we demonstrate the feasibility of our state vector
machine approach by discussing the overall quality of our
classification model regarding precision, recall, and accuracy.
Finally, we present the results for the large scale security
classification of all security-related code snippets found on
Stack Overflow.
1) Labeling of Training Set: As described above, the
training set consists of code snippets that have been identified
by the oracle-based filter to include security-related properties
(cf. Section III). We classified a fraction of this set manually
in order to provide supervision to the SVM. Subsequently,
the SVM was able to classify the whole security-related set
provided by the filter.
a) TLS/SSL: We found 431 (31.48%) of all snippets in
the training set to be TLS related, among these we rated
277 (20.23%) as insecure. In other words, almost one third
of security-related discussions seem to target communication
security and more than half of the related snippets would
introduce a potential risk in real-world applications. The ma-
jority of TLS snippets are insecure because of using a default
hostname verifier or overriding the default TrustManager of
java.net.ssl when initializing custom TLS sockets. Every sin-
gle custom TrustManager implementation we found consists
of empty methods that disable certificate validation checks
completely, while none of the custom TrustManager are used
to implement custom certificate pinning, which is the reason-
able and secure use case for creating custom TrustManagers.
This correlates to our assumption stated in Section VII-A.
An empty TrustManager is implemented by 156 snippets,
while 6 snippets use the AllowAllHostNameVerifier - and 2
implemented both. We found 42 snippets that override the
verification method of HostnameVerifier of java.net.ssl by
returning true unconditionally, which ultimately disables
hostname verification completely (cf. Listing 1). This change
to the HostnameVerifier implements the same behavior as
AllowAllHostNameVerifier.
We found several snippets that modify the list of supported
ciphers. In all cases, insecure ciphers were added to the list.
We assume this is caused by reasons of either legacy or
compatibility.
b) Symmetric Cryptography: We found 189 (13.80%) of
all snippets in the training set to be related to symmetric
cryptography, among these we rated 159 (11.61%) of the snip-
pets as insecure. For example, we found snippets containing
encryption/decryption methods with less than 5 lines of code,
implementing the minimum of code needed to accomplish an
encryption operation. These snippets were insecure by using
the cipher transformation string ”AES” which uses ECB as
default mode of operation (cf. Section IV-B2). Developers
might be unaware of this default behavior or of ECB being
insecure.
Another example are snippets that create raw keys and raw
IVs using empty byte arrays (i. e. byte arrays which consist
of zeros only), derive raw IVs directly from static strings, or
by using the array indexes as actual field values as shown
in Listing 2. Other snippets derive raw keys directly from
strings that were mostly simple and insecure passphrases,
e.g. ”ThisIsSecretEncryptionKey”, ”MyDifficultPassw”. We
also found snippets that initialized the IV using the secret key.
c) Asymmetric Cryptography: We found 59 (4.3%) of
all code snippets in the training set to include asymmetric
cryptography API calls, among these 13 (0.94%) of the
snippets were classified as insecure. Considering the
importance of public key cryptography in key distribution
and establishing secure communication channels, 4.3% is
quite low and corresponds to our assumption in Section
VII-A. All insecure snippets used weak key lengths which
varied between 256 and 1024 bits for RSA keys. Obviously,
recommendations from public authorities (e.g. the NIST)
regarding secure cryptographic parameters are not fully taken
into consideration.
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d) (Secure) Random Number Generation: We found 30
(2.19%) of all code snippets in the training set to include
(secure) random number generation API calls, among these
29 (2.11%) of the snippets were classified as insecure.
All insecure snippets explicitly seeded the random number
generator with static strings (cf. Listing 3). Replacing
the random number generator’s seed this way and not
supplementing it results in low entropy [31].
e) Digital Signatures and Message Digests: Overall, 279
(20.37%) snippets contain digital signatures related API calls.
We classified none of them as insecure. This is a remarkable
and unexpected observation, especially compared to the high
number of insecure snippets in discussions regarding sym-
metric cryptography. To explain this we had a closer look
at the relevant code snippets: calls to the digital signatures
API are most often related to extracting existing signatures,
not to validate them or generate new ones. Such an interactive
query of existing signatures is not very error-prone regarding
security.
Further, we found 392 (28.63%) snippets to contain
message digest related API calls, among these 14 (1.02%)
were classified as insecure due to usage of weak hash
algorithms. Again, compared to the quantity of insecure
snippets of other categories this is quite a low percentage. In
generating a message digest the biggest pitfall is choosing
a weak hash function. We assume that state-of-the-art hash
functions are relatively established in the Stack Overflow
community.
f) Remaining: 19 (1.38%) of the snippets contained
authentication code, where one snippet was classified as
insecure. Eight (0.58%) contained secure storage code, where
three snippets were classified as insecure.
g) Not Security-Relevant: We classified 342 snippets as
not security-relevant as defined in III-C.
2) Model Evaluation of SVM Code Classifier: We report
our model evaluation on binary SVM classifier trained on
the labeled training data set. Overall, after removing some
duplicates, the training data set consists of 1360 samples, out
of which 420 code snippets are identified as insecure. As
introduced in Section V-B, we use a tf-idf vectorizer to convert
code snippets into numeric vectors for training.
To better illustrate how SVM works, we show in Figure
3 a demonstration in 2d dimension, where we project the
training samples in 2d space by a common dimensionality
reduction method, i.e., Principle Component Analysis (PCA)
[40]. The PCA algorithm preserves two of the most informative
dimensions by transforming the original coordinate system,
and then a binary SVM is trained on the transformed data set.
We leverage a RBF (Radial Basis Function) kernel function
to tackle the non-linearity hidden in the projected training
samples. The RBF kernel is a well known type of kernel
to model non-linearity of data. It maps the non-linear input
data to a high dimensional linear feature space, such that the
data becomes linearly separable. We can see that even in 2d
space where some relevant information might be lost, the SVM
classifier can still produce a relatively good class boundary
for both the secure (blue dots) and insecure (red dots) code
samples.
Fig. 3: SVM with RBF kernel is trained on the training dataset,
where the high dimensional training samples are projected on
2-dimensional using PCA. Solid contour line represents the
classification boundary and dashed lines indicate the maximal
margin learned by SVM. Insecure code snippets are marked
as red circles, and secure ones are marked as blue circles.
Next, we evaluate our SVM model quantitatively by cross
validating the training data set. First, we conduct a grid search
on SVM to estimate the optimal penalty term C (cf. (1))
with respect to classification accuracy. Since the training data
contains very high dimensional features, we use a linear kernel
for SVM instead of RBF kernel in previous 2d demonstration.
The optimal parameter C is determined by cross validation to
be 0.644 that is then fixed for the next evaluation steps. We
evaluate the model on various training sizes with respect to
precision, recall and accuracy. A discussion on these evalua-
tion metrics can be found in [41]. In our experiment setup,
we consider insecure samples as positive and secure ones as
negative. Therefore, the precision score measures how many
predicted insecure snippets are indeed insecure, recall score
evaluates how many real insecure snippets are retrieved from
all insecure snippets, and finally the accuracy score measures
an overall classification performance taking both positive and
negative samples into account.
In Figure 4, we report the learning curve of our model
with respect to varying training sizes. For each training size, a
subset of the training data set is classified by the model with a
50-repetition cross validation. In each repetition, we randomly
hold out 20% of the training samples as testing set, and
train on the remaining samples. Then, we evaluate the metrics
respectively on the test set. Finally, we average the testing
scores on all repetitions and plot the mean scores with standard
deviation as the error bar. The results present a good precision
and accuracy on varying training sizes, as the mean scores
are approximately all above 0.8. The constantly developing
precision curve shows us that our model performs very well
on detecting real insecure snippets instead of introducing too
many false positives, even on a small training size. On the
other hand, we see the recall curve is relatively poor on small
training size. However, it reaches nearly 0.75 when we have
more than 1000 training samples. Accuracy also improves with
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Fig. 4: Binary SVM with linear kernel is trained over varying
training sizes. Cross validation is performed on each of these
subsets of the training data set and evaluated with respect to
precision, recall and accuracy scores.
increasing training samples. The variance of the accuracy is
canceled by combining both precision and recall.
For completeness, we conduct a 5-fold cross validation on
the whole training data set with optimal penalty term C =
0.644. We report the confusion matrix of the best fold in Table
VIII. Note that the test size for each fold is 272.
True/Predicted Secure (-1) Insecure (+1)
Secure (-1) 181 7
Insecure (+1) 19 65
Summary accuracy: 0.904 precision: 0.903
TABLE VIII: Confusion matrix
To conclude our model evaluation, we argue that our SVM
model can be even improved by conducting more effort on
feature engineering and also by increasing the size of the
training data set. In our experiment, we only remove comments
in code snippets as a preprocessing step. In practice, this will
be enhanced by applying a more complex token parser, e.g.,
static code parser, to generate better quality of features. More-
over, we did not leverage control flow information, which is
considered informative of predicting security level, to enhance
the model. A trivial refinement could be that we encode the
relative position of each token in the snippet into the features.
However, this could double the size of input feature dimension.
Due to the complexity of model pruning and limit of training
sample size, we decided to leave it for future work. Given the
fact that the performance of the SVM model already achieves
a level of practicability, we think that machine learning based
methods can be a very strong supplementary for security code
analysis.
3) Large Scale Classification: We applied the SVM code
classifier on the complete set of 3,834 distinct security-
related snippets from Stack Overflow. Overall, we found
1,161 (30.28%) insecure snippets and 2,673 (69.72%) secure
snippets. Out of the 1,360 distinct snippets found in answer
posts, 420 (30.88%) snippets were classified as insecure and
and 940 (69.12%) as secure. For the 2,474 distinct snippets
we detected in questions posts, 741 (29.95%) snippets were
classified as insecure and 1,733 (70.05%) as secure.
C. Evaluation of Code Detection
We applied our toolchain for code snippet detection
(cf. Section VI) on a large corpus of free Android
applications from Google Play. Beginning in October
2015, we successfully downloaded 1,305,820 free Android
applicationsfrom Google Play5. We re-downloaded new
versions of apps until May 2016. The majority of apps
received their newest update within the last 12 months.
1) Apps with copied and pasted code snippets: Overall,
we detected copied and pasted snippets in 200,672 (15.4%)
apps. Of these apps, 198,347 (15.2%) contain a question
snippet and 40,786 (3.1%) apps contain an answer snippet.
An overwhelming amount of apps contain an insecure code
snippet: 196,403 (15%) apps contain at least one. The top
offending snippet has been found in 180,388 (13.81%) apps
and is presented in Listing 4. The remaining insecure snippets
were found in 43,941 (3,37%) distinct apps.
We found 506,922 (38.82%) apps that contain a secure
snippet. The most frequent secure snippet was detected in
408,011 (31.24%) apps while the remaining snippets were
contained in less then 73,839 (5.65%) apps. On average, an
insecure snippet is found in 4,539.96 apps, while a secure code
snippet is found in 10,719.83 apps.
To investigate insecure snippets that were detected by our
fully automated processing pipeline in detail, we performed
a manual post-analysis of the categories described in Section
IV. To be more precise, we examined all security-related
snippets that were detected in applications and sorted them
by category. In the following, we give counts for affected
applications for each security category. The given percentage
values are related to applications that contain a snippet from
Stack Overflow. Further, we discuss the most offending
snippets and estimate their practical exploitability.
2) SSL/TLS: The highest number of apps that implemented
an insecure code snippet used this snippet to handle TLS.
183,268 (14.03%) apps were affected by insecure TLS
handling through a copied and pasted insecure code snippet.
Conversely, only 441 (0.03%) of all apps contained a
secure code snippet related to TLS. For the large majority
of 182,659 (13.98%) apps with an insecure TLS snippet,
their code snippet matches a question code snippet on Stack
Overflow, while only 22,040 (1.68%) apps contain an insecure
TLS snippet that was present in an answer on Stack Overflow.
A high risk example in this category is given by the top
offending snippet as presented in Listing 4, which uses an
insecure custom TrustManager as described in Section VII-A.
5cf. https://play.google.com
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Missing server verification enables Man-In-The-Middle
attacks by presenting malicious certificates during the TLS
handshake. This snippet is a real threat with high risk of
exploitation in the wild, as shown in [2].
3) Symmetric Cryptography: The second highest number
of insecure code snippets in the wild were used for symmetric
cryptography in 21,239 (1.62%) apps. 19,452 (1.48%) of
the apps with a code snippet that was related to symmetric
cryptography had integrated a secure snippet. With a count of
19,189 apps, slightly more apps contain an insecure question
snippet than an insecure answer snippet, which happened
in 15,125 apps. The insecure snippet with the highest copy
and paste count (found in 18,000 apps) within this category
proposes AES in ECB mode. According to [3] this is
vulnerable to chosen-plaintext attacks. Further, applications
that include snippets with hard-coded cryptographic keys can
most often be reverse-engineered without much effort. This
leads leads to key leakage and therefore states a high risk (at
least in the case where the key is not obfuscated).
4) Asymmetric Cryptography: We found only 114 (0.01%)
apps that contained an insecure code snippet related to
asymmetric cryptography, 698 (0.05%) apps contained a
secure asymmetric cryptography related snippet. 114 apps
with insecure snippets contain an insecure question snippet.
29 apps implemented a secure answer snippet, 688 a secure
question snippet.
5) Secure Random Number Generation: 8,228 (0.63%)
apps contain an insecure code snippet related to random
number generation, while 4,100 (0.31%) apps contained a
secure snippet. Most insecurities in this category come from
question snippets (this was true for 8,227 apps, while 7,991
apps contain an insecure answer snippet).
6) Hashes: For hash functions, the majority of apps
containing code snippets from Stack Overflow contained
secure code snippets: This was true in 4,012 (0.3%), 14 apps
contained an insecure one.
7) Signatures: 15 apps contained a secure signature related
snippet, while no insecure snippet was found in apps in this
category. All of those snippets could be found in questions
on Stack Overflow.
8) Not Security-Related: Some of the snippets that were
detected in apps could not be assigned to one of the categories
above because they were not security-related as described in
III-C. 498,046 (38.1%) apps contained a snippet that was not
security-related and therefore classified as secure.
The most frequent secure snippet found in 408,011 apps
was also not security-related. Therefore, considering security-
related snippets only, we can state that significantly more
Android applications contain an insecure snippet (196,403)
than a secure one (73,839) (cf. Section VII-C1).
9) Sensitive App Categories: The largest number of sensi-
tive apps that use insecure copied and pasted code snippets are
14,944 business apps, 4,707 shopping apps, and 4,243 finance
apps. We find this result rather surprising, as we would have
expected that security receives special consideration for these
types of applications. Especially, finance apps have access
to bank account information and therefore we would have
expected them to be developed with extra care. Security and
privacy is especially important in apps that handle medical
data, as leaked sensitive data can have a severe impact on
users. We found 2,000 medical and 4,222 health&fitness apps
that copied and pasted vulnerable Stack Overflow code. Apps
that are used for communication (3,745 apps) and social media
(4,459 apps) are also widely affected.
Fig. 5: Distributions of insecure snippets found in Apps
10) Download Counts: In order to prove that we did not
only inspect the long tail of unpopular apps provided by
Google Play we provide download counts for apps that contain
insecure snippets in Figure 6.
D. Evaluation of Community Feedback
For those insecure snippets that were detected in Android
applications, we analyzed the community feedback on Stack
Overflow as this represents the current public evaluation of
posted code snippets. The available feedback mechanisms
allow a very general evaluation of code snippets, e. g. with
the presentation of view counters and the individual post
score which results from up-/down-votes by the community.
In addition to this, code snippets can be commented which is
used to provide a more detailed feedback.
We analyzed if the existing feedback system provided by
SO is capable of informing the user about insecure snippets
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Fig. 6: Download counts for Apps with insecure snippets
in an adequate way. At that, we analyze if the currently given
feedback by the community is preventing or contributing to
copy and paste of insecure code into Android applications.
1) Scoring: According to Stack Overflow, a question snip-
pet is supposed to be up-voted if it shows reasonable research
effort in order to motivate the community to reply to it.
Therefore, with pure focus on security aspects we expect
insecure question snippets to be up-voted, as insecure code
snippets intuitively demand more community research than
secure ones. In contrast to question scores, answers are up-
voted (according to Stack Overflow) if they are estimated
useful. Regarding the score of insecure answer snippets we
expect a lower score as these do not provide a useful answer
considering security-related snippets.
The results in table IX show that the scoring of insecure
question snippets contradict to our assumption, because the
secure ones have a higher score. In other words, the com-
munity assigns a higher needed research effort to questions
with secure snippets. This is counter-intuitive from the security
perspective and therefore leads to the conclusion that question
scoring is not an adequate way of evaluating security. Of
course, the community estimates needed research effort on
the basis of a diversity of aspects, which outweigh security
considerations. However, regarding answers, the low scoring
of insecure snippets (as depicted in Table IX) correspond to
our expectations. Again, this positive correlation might be
caused by a variety of aspects, but from the security point
of view it reveals the desired community behavior. However,
aspects that are currently taken account for answer scoring are
likely to be weighted differently in the future.
Next, we additionally include security warnings in our eval-
uation. Here, the scoring for questions given by the community
are consistent with our intuition: Insecure questions including
a warning are assigned with a higher scoring (corresponding
to higher estimated research effort) than questions without
such a warning. However, the scoring estimation regarding
answer posts contradicts the desired community behavior: In-
secure answers with security warning are scored significantly
higher compared to the ones without warnings (cf. Table
IX). Therefore, the influence of warnings (in answers) on the
community score is highly questionable. A high scored answer
with assigned security warning might confuse the reader.
The following considerations try an explanation of this
result. Though a security warning should have a strong impact
on the evaluation, the author of the warning can down-vote the
score only once. On the one hand, this gives the community
the ability to review the warning and to further reduce the
score or to comment disagreement. On the other hand, the
results show that the scoring of insecure snippets is partly
contradicting and we did not find a single warning that has
been questioned in a subsequent comment. Acar et al. [42]
have shown that developers prefer functional snippets over
secure snippets when implementing security related tasks in
Android. This preference might also influence the scoring of
security-related snippets which can result into a score that
mostly considers functionality as the definition of a useful
answer.
When solely taking security considerations into account, we
conclude that the currently deployed feedback system is insuf-
ficient for providing reliable and precise security estimation to
the user.
Metadata Secure Insecure Insecure+Warning Insecure-Warning
Avg. Score Q/A 3.4/4.8 1.7/4.4 2.4/15.5 2.3/6.2
Avg. Viewcount Q/A 1467/4341 2254/8117 4081/16534 2812/10001
TABLE IX: Community feedback for security-related snippets
regarding questions (Q) and answers (A)
2) Impact on copy and paste: Next, we investigated if
view count, warnings, and score of insecure snippets have
an impact on the extent they are copied into applications.
We first ordered all snippets according to their detection
rate (the amount of applications that contained that snippet).
For the snippets that ranked highest and lowest on this list
(respectively 25% – we refer to these as top and bottom tier)
we extracted the corresponding metadata from Stack Overflow.
This allowed us to observe possible correlations between view
counts, warnings, and scoring to the actual copy and paste rate.
For both score and view count we found a positive correla-
tion: A higher score or view count corresponds to an increased
copy and paste count, as depicted in Table X. This yields for
both, questions and answers.
Interestingly, we see the opposite behavior with regard to
warnings: Snippets that have been commented with security
warnings are copied more often into applications than those
without. An exceptionally striking example for this observation
is the top offending snippet which was copied 180,388 times
despite of being commented with warnings (cf. Listing 4).
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Metadata Questions Answers
Avg. Score (top/bottom tier) 1.87/1.27 7.21/6.37
Avg. Viewcount (top/bottom tier) 2,792/1,373 11,915/7805
TABLE X: Correlation of community feedback with copy and
paste count of insecure code snippets
E. Limitations
Besides the limitations of the intermediate steps discussed
in Sections III-C and IV-C, the overall processing pipeline
does not fully prove that copied snippets originate from Stack
Overflow. To illustrate this objection, there theoretically could
exist a third platform where snippets are copied and inserted to
both, Stack Overflow and Google Play. However, Stack Over-
flow is the most popular platform for developer discussions6.
Further, [42] et al. showed that developers most often rely on
Stack Overflow when solving security-related programming
problems at hand. And finally, we found a positive correlation
of the snippets view counts with their detected presence in
applications (as discussed in Section VII-D2). Therefore, it is
very likely that snippets originate from Stack Overflow.
VIII. RELATED WORK
We focus on related work in four key areas, i.e. security
of mobile apps, developer studies, investigation of Stack
Overflow, and detection of code reusage in apps.
A. Security of Mobile Apps
Fahl et al. analyzed the security of TLS code in 13,500
popular, free Android applications [2]. They found that 8%
were vulnerable to Man-In-The-Middle attacks. In follow-up
work, they extended their investigation to iOS and found simi-
lar results: 20% of the analyzed apps were vulnerable to Man-
In-The-Middle attacks [17]. Oltrogge et al. [18] investigated
the applicability of public key pinning in Android applications
and came to the conclusion that pinning was not as widely
applicable as commonly believed. Egele et al. [3] investigated
the secure use of cryptography APIs in Android applications
and found more than 10,000 apps misusing cryptographic
primitives in insecure ways. Enck et al. [43] presented Taint-
Droid, a tool that applies dynamic taint tracking to reveal how
Android applications actually use permission-protected data.
They found a number of questionable privacy practices in
apps and suggested modifications of the Android permission
model and access control mechanism for inter-component
communication. Chin et al [44] characterized errors in inter-
application communications (intents) that can lead to inter-
ception of private data, service hijacking, and control-flow
attacks. Enck et al. [45] analyzed 1,100 Android applications
and reported widespread security problems, including the use
of fine-grained location information in potentially unexpected
ways, using device IDs for fingerprinting and tracking and
transmitting device and location in plaintext. Poeplau et
al. [46] reported that many apps load application code via
6http://www.alexa.com/topsites
insecure channels allowing attackers to inject malicious code
into benign apps.
B. Developer Studies
The bulk of identified security issues are attributed to devel-
opers that are poorly skilled in security-related programming.
Core reasons for these issues were identified in a developer
study conducted by Fahl et al. [17]: developers that customized
TLS code disabled TLS functionality during testing and forgot
to re-enable it for production, and they did not understand the
security guarantees provided by and the security consequences
imposed by improper TLS use. Similar root causes were
reported by Georgiev et al. [47], showing that developers were
confused by the many parameters, options and defaults of TLS
APIs. Both papers explicitly mentioned Stack Overflow as a
platform that provides various solutions for ”circumventing”
TLS-related error messages by disabling TLS features. Acar
et al. [42] conducted a laboratory study to investigate the
impact of information sources on code security and found
that developers using Stack Overflow for looking up security-
related issues produced the most functional but also the most
insecure code, whereas participants using Android’s official
documentation produced more secure but less functional code.
C. Investigation of Stack Overflow
Treude et al. [48] report that developer discussion platforms
like Stack Overflow are very effective at code reviews and
conceptual questions. Vasilescu et al. [49] investigate the
interplay of Stack Overflow activity and development process
on GitHub. They conclude that knowledge of the GitHub
community flows into Stack Overflow. In turn, this knowledge
increases the number of commits of Stack Overflow users on
GitHub. Vasquez et al. [50] created an algorithm to link Stack
Overflow questions with Android classes detected in source
code. They found that Android developer question counts peak
on Stack Overflow immediately after APIs receive updates that
modify their behavior.
D. Detection of Code Reusage in Apps
Jiang et al. [39] compared the similarity of abstract syntax
trees to detect code duplicates in source code. Hanna et
al. [38] created k-gram streams from bytecode basic blocks.
Each k-gram defines a program feature. A code snippet and
an application is represented by the binary feature vector
that is created using universal hashing over k-grams. They
decide if a code snippet is contained in an app by dividing
the number of common features by the number of features
of the code snippet. While their approach works in benign
scenarios, it is not robust against trivial code modifications
(e. g. reordering of instructions or renaming of variables).
Crussell et al. [35], [36] detect code clones by searching for
subgraph isomophisms of program dependency graphs (PDG).
Their approach is able to detect code fragments that perform
similar computations through different syntactic variants [51]
and robust against trivial modifications, constant renaming
and method/class restructuring. Chen et al. [51] use Control
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Flow Graphs (CFG) in combination with opcodes to detect
code clones in Android applications. They define a geometry
characteristic called centroid to embed a CFG into vector
space.
IX. COUNTERMEASURES
Now that we evaluated the extent of code flow from Stack
Overflow to Google Play we discuss possible improvements
for the current situation. On the one hand, there is a significant
amount of secure code on Stack Overflow that finds its way
into real world applications. How can we reinforce this flow
that surely is beneficial for the Android ecosystem? On the
other hand, we also observed a vast amount of highly insecure
code copied into critical applications. How can we prevent
insecure code snippets from being copied?
In Section VII-D we showed that the deployed scoring
system of Stack Overflow is not fine-grained enough to mirror
security concerns provided by the community. This suggests
a scoring system that is purely focused on security aspects.
However, a fine-grained scoring system will possibly also
include equitable aspects such as code stability, efficiency, or
audibility. This might impact the overall usability of Stack
Overflow and we fully understand the decision for just one
score for each post.
Instead of expanding (and maybe complicating) the scoring
system of posts, we propose another solution: Classification of
code snippets into secure and insecure is fully automated in our
approach, which allows us to implement a browser-plugin that
directly indicates security issues by real-time classification of
snippets. This includes both, snippets copied to the clipboard
and snippets parsed on the actually watched discussion thread.
Such a browser plugin is not limited to Stack Overflow, but
would work without much effort for any source of snippets in
the web. We are currently actively developing such a browser
plugin for Mozilla Firefox.
X. CONCLUSION
We present the first systematic and fully automated approach
for measuring the flow of secure and insecure code from
open developer platforms into Android market places. After
scanning public discussion threads for code snippets and
filtering the security-relevant fraction with a robust oracle-
based filter, we apply machine learning classification to get a
security scoring of relevant code snippets. By constructing an
abstract representation in form of a program dependency graph
for each snippet we detect their presence in closed source
Android applications. Processing crowd-sourced code this way
allows us to perform large-scale analysis of the proliferation
of insecure code into large repositories.
We show the feasibility of our approach by scanning Google
Play for insecure code copied from Stack Overflow. This
choice is motivated by popularity and market dominance of
both platforms, which serve as representative examples. We
show that more than 196k of the 1.3 million applications
from Google Play contain vulnerable code copied from Stack
Overflow (cf. Section VII-E). We detected 73k applications
(cf. SectionVII-C8) using a secure code snippet from Stack
Overflow. By analyzing metadata we gain insight into de-
veloper behavior: From typical post up-voting trends and
popularity of insecure code to favoured security libraries of
specific domains (such as finance and gaming) we are able to
draw interesting new conclusions on behavior of the Android
developer community. We expect that a future systematic
investigation augmenting metadata of security-related code
snippets with metadata of their real-world clones in application
repositories will serve as a rich source of new and interesting
research questions.
So should Stack Overflow be considered harmful? From
classical risk evaluation perspective, the answer to this ques-
tion depends on domain specific assets: A banking application
with flawed cryptographic key initialization causes severe
damage to the respective bank, even if the application has
a relatively small user group. The same flaw in a set of
popular gaming apps with very high download counts might
not represent a major threat to the individual game devel-
oper studios, but has the potential to impact the Android
ecosystem on a large scale. So depending on perspective,
domain specific assets, and associated risks, the concrete
threats posed by copying crowd-sourced code into applications
must be evaluated individually. Finally, we want to stress
the benefits of including secure code snippets into real-world
applications. We identified several secure code snippets in
critical applications, which is of great good for the community.
In a broad sense we infer conclusions regarding secu-
rity of the Android ecosystem from comprehensive analysis
of community discussions. We strongly believe that future
research based on large scale data mining of community
discussions will provide unexpected new and exciting insights
into information security in general.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would like to thank Siddharth Subramanian
for his strong support with JavaBaker and the anonymous
reviewers for their helpful comments.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Porter Felt, E. Chin, S. Hanna, D. Song, and D. Wagner, “Android
Permissions Demystified,” in Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security. ACM Press, Oct. 2011.
[2] S. Fahl, M. Harbach, T. Muders, M. Smith, L. Baumga¨rtner, and
B. Freisleben, “Why Eve and Mallory love Android: An analysis of
Android SSL (in) security,” in Proc. 19th ACM Conference on Computer
and Communication Security (CCS’12). ACM, 2012.
[3] M. Egele, D. Brumley, Y. Fratantonio, and C. Kruegel, “An empirical
study of cryptographic misuse in android applications,” in Proceedings
of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer & Communications
Security, ser. CCS ’13, 2013.
[4] Oracle, “Java SE 8,” http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/javase/
tech/index-jsp-136007.html.
[5] A. Zhitnitsky, “Libraries on github,” http://blog.takipi.com/
we-analyzed-60678-libraries-on-github-here-are-the-top-100, 2015.
[6] T. Duong and J. Rizzo, “Cryptography in the web: The case of
cryptographic design flaws in asp.net,” in 2011 IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy, 2011.
[7] A. Dey and S. Weis, “Keyczar: A cryptographic toolkit,” 2008.
[8] jasypt, “Java simplified encryption,” http://www.jasypt.org, 2014.
15
[9] D. Gonza´lez, O. Esparza, J. L. Mun˜oz, J. Alins, and J. Mata, Future
Network Systems and Security: First International Conference, FNSS
2015, Paris, France, June 11-13, 2015, Proceedings. Cham: Springer
International Publishing, 2015, ch. Evaluation of Cryptographic Capa-
bilities for the Android Platform, pp. 16–30.
[10] B. Dagenais and L. Hendren, “Enabling static analysis for partial java
programs,” in Proceedings of the 23rd ACM SIGPLAN Conference on
Object-oriented Programming Systems Languages and Applications, ser.
OOPSLA ’08, 2008.
[11] S. Subramanian, L. Inozemtseva, and R. Holmes, “Live api documenta-
tion,” in Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Software
Engineering, ser. ICSE 2014, 2014.
[12] Y. Sheffer and R. Holz, “Recommendations for secure use of transport
layer security (tls) and datagram transport layer security (dtls),” Tech.
Rep., 2015.
[13] B. Kaliski, “PKCS #5: Password-Based cryptography specification
version 2.0,” Internet Engineering Task Force, RFC 2898, Sep. 2000.
[Online]. Available: http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2898.txt
[14] J. Manger, “A chosen ciphertext attack on rsa optimal asymmetric en-
cryption padding (oaep) as standardized in pkcs #1 v2.0,” in Proceedings
of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in
Cryptology, ser. CRYPTO ’01, 2001.
[15] E. Barker and A. Roginsky, “Transitions: Recommendation for transi-
tioning the use of cryptographic algorithms and key lengths,” http://
nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar1.pdf.
[16] D. Bleichenbacher, “Chosen ciphertext attacks against protocols based
on the rsa encryption standard pkcs #1,” in Proceedings of the 18th
Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology,
ser. CRYPTO ’98, 1998.
[17] S. Fahl, M. Harbach, H. Perl, M. Koetter, and M. Smith, “Rethinking
ssl development in an appified world,” in Proceedings of the 2013 ACM
SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security, ser. CCS
’13. ACM, 2013, pp. 49–60.
[18] M. Oltrogge, Y. Acar, S. Dechand, M. Smith, and S. Fahl, “To pin or
not to pin—helping app developers bullet proof their tls connections,”
in Proc. 24th USENIX Security Symposium (SEC’15). USENIX
Association, 2015.
[19] S. Turner and T. Polk, “Prohibiting secure sockets layer (ssl) version
2.0,” 2011.
[20] E. Rescorla, “The transport layer security (tls) protocol version 1.3,”
Tech. Rep., 2016.
[21] T. Dierks and E. Rescorla, “The transport layer security (tls) protocol
version 1.2,” Tech. Rep., 2008.
[22] S. Vaudenay, “Security flaws induced by cbc padding - applications to
ssl, ipsec, wtls ...” in Proceedings of the International Conference on
the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in
Cryptology, ser. EUROCRYPT ’02, 2002.
[23] J. Kelsey, B. Schneier, and D. Wagner, “Related-key cryptanalysis of
3-way, biham-des, cast, des-x, newdes, rc2, and tea,” in Proceedings of
the First International Conference on Information and Communication
Security, ser. ICICS ’97, 1997.
[24] N. J. AlFardan, D. J. Bernstein, K. G. Paterson, B. Poettering, and J. C.
Schuldt, “On the security of rc4 in tls.” in Usenix security, 2013.
[25] S. Lucks, Fast Software Encryption: 5th International Workshop, FSE’
98 Paris, France, March 23–25, 1998 Proceedings, 1998, ch. Attacking
Triple Encryption.
[26] S. Vaudenay, “On the weak keys of blowfish,” in Fast Software Encryp-
tion, 1996.
[27] O. Kara and C. Manap, “A new class of weak keys for blowfish,” in
Fast Software Encryption, 2007.
[28] “Java security and related topics,” http://armoredbarista.blogspot.de/
2012/09/rsaecb-how-block-operation-modes-and.html.
[29] D. Giry, “Keylength,” https://www.keylength.com/en/4/.
[30] SANS Institute, “Four attacks on oauth - how to secure your oauth imple-
mentation,” https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/
attacks-oauth-secure-oauth-implementation-33644.
[31] “Android Developers,” http://android-developers.blogspot.de/2013/02/
using-cryptography-to-store-credentials.html.
[32] B. Scho¨lkopf, “Statistical learning and kernel methods,”
Microsoft Research, MSR-TR 2000-23, 2000. [Online]. Avail-
able: http://www.research.microsoft.com/scripts/pubs/view.asp?TR\
ID=MSR-TR-2000-23
[33] H. C. Wu, R. W. P. Luk, K. F. Wong, and K. L. Kwok, “Interpreting
tf-idf term weights as making relevance decisions,” ACM Trans. Inf.
Syst., vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 13:1–13:37, Jun. 2008. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1361684.1361686
[34] Google Inc., “Enjarify,” https://github.com/google/enjarify.
[35] J. Crussell, C. Gibler, and H. Chen, ESORICS 2012: 17th European
Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Pisa, Italy, September
10-12, 2012. Proceedings, 2012, ch. Attack of the Clones: Detecting
Cloned Applications on Android Markets.
[36] ——, ESORICS 2013: 18th European Symposium on Research in Com-
puter Security, Egham, UK, September 9-13, 2013. Proceedings, 2013,
ch. AnDarwin: Scalable Detection of Semantically Similar Android
Applications.
[37] K. RIESEN and H. BUNKE, “Graph classification based on vector space
embedding,” International Journal of Pattern Recognition and Artificial
Intelligence, 2009.
[38] S. Hanna, L. Huang, E. Wu, S. Li, C. Chen, and D. Song, “Juxtapp: A
scalable system for detecting code reuse among android applications,”
in Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Detection of
Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment, ser. DIMVA’12,
2013.
[39] L. Jiang, G. Misherghi, Z. Su, and S. Glondu, “Deckard: Scalable and
accurate tree-based detection of code clones,” in Proceedings of the 29th
International Conference on Software Engineering, ser. ICSE ’07, 2007.
[40] L. I. Smith, “A tutorial on principal components analysis,”
Cornell University, USA, Tech. Rep., February 26 2002. [On-
line]. Available: http://www.cs.otago.ac.nz/cosc453/student tutorials/
principal components.pdf
[41] J. Makhoul, F. Kubala, R. Schwartz, and R. Weischedel, “Performance
measures for information extraction,” in In Proceedings of DARPA
Broadcast News Workshop, 1999, pp. 249–252.
[42] Y. Acar, M. Backes, S. Fahl, D. Kim, M. L. Mazurek, and C. Stransky,
“You get where you’re looking for: The impact of information sources
on code security,” IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2016.
[43] W. Enck, P. Gilbert, B.-G. Chun, L. P. Cox, J. Jung, P. McDaniel,
and A. N. Sheth, “Taintdroid: An information-flow tracking system for
realtime privacy monitoring on smartphones,” in Proc. 9th Usenix Sym-
posium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI’10).
USENIX Association, 2010.
[44] E. Chin, A. P. Felt, K. Greenwood, and D. Wagner, “Analyzing inter-
application communication in android,” in Proceedings of the 9th
international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services.
ACM, 2011, pp. 239–252.
[45] W. Enck, D. Octeau, P. McDaniel, and S. Chaudhuri, “A Study of
Android Application Security,” in Proceedings of the 20th USENIX
Conference on Security, Aug. 2011.
[46] S. Poeplau, Y. Fratantonio, A. Bianchi, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna,
“Execute this! analyzing unsafe and malicious dynamic code loading
in android applications,” in Proc. 21st Annual Network and Distributed
System Security Symposium (NDSS’14). The Internet Society, 2014.
[47] M. Georgiev, S. Iyengar, S. Jana, R. Anubhai, D. Boneh, and
V. Shmatikov, “The Most Dangerous Code in the World: Validating SSL
Certificates in Non-Browser Software,” in Proceedings of the 2012 ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications security. ACM Press,
Oct. 2012.
[48] C. Treude, O. Barzilay, and M.-A. Storey, “How do programmers ask
and answer questions on the web?: Nier track,” in Software Engineering
(ICSE), 2011 33rd International Conference on. IEEE, 2011.
[49] B. Vasilescu, V. Filkov, and A. Serebrenik, “Stackoverflow and github:
Associations between software development and crowdsourced knowl-
edge,” in Social Computing (SocialCom), 2013 International Conference
on. IEEE, 2013.
[50] M. Linares-Va´squez, G. Bavota, M. Di Penta, R. Oliveto, and D. Poshy-
vanyk, “How do api changes trigger stack overflow discussions? a study
on the android sdk,” in proceedings of the 22nd International Conference
on Program Comprehension. ACM, 2014.
[51] K. Chen, P. Liu, and Y. Zhang, “Achieving accuracy and scalability
simultaneously in detecting application clones on android markets,” in
Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Software Engineer-
ing, ser. ICSE 2014. ACM, 2014.
16
APPENDIX
Listing 1: Empty HostnameVerifier - Accepts all hostnames
@Override
public boolean verify(String hostname, SSLSession
session) {
return true;
}
Listing 2: Sample of static IVs and Keys in Snippets
byte[] rawSecretKey = {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0
x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
String iv = "00000000";
byte[] iv = new byte[] { 0x0, 0x1, 0x2, 0x3, 0x4,
0x5, 0x6, 0x7, 0x8, 0x9, 0xA, 0xB, 0xC, 0xD,
0xE, 0xF };
Listing 3: String used to replace the random number
generators seed
byte[] keyStart = "this is a key".getBytes();
SecureRandom sr =
SecureRandom.getInstance("SHA1PRNG");
sr.setSeed(keyStart);
Listing 4: Top offending snippet
TrustManager tm = new X509TrustManager() {
public void checkClientTrusted(
X509Certificate[] chain, String authType)
throws CertificateException { }
public void checkServerTrusted(
X509Certificate[] chain, String authType)
throws CertificateException { }
public X509Certificate[] getAcceptedIssuers()
{ return null; }
};
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